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INTRODUCTION

Throughout our nation's history, the U.S. court system has been an essential part of the framework that shapes the laws and views of society.
As important a role a judge plays in any case, the role of the juror is
equally important. Every day throughout the United States, panels of
jurors comprised of citizens representing virtually every facet of society,
are appointed the duty to decide an infinite number of criminal and civil
disputes.' Without juries, our nation's court system would not have the
legitimacy it does today. The goal behind a jury trial is to ensure the
court renders a judgment that subscribes to the laws and regulations established by the various branches of government and that correctly and
accurately represents societal views. 2 Such a goal can only be accomplished by assembling a group of individuals whose judgment reflects society as a whole. 3 This includes mixing the educated with the ignorant,
the shy with the outspoken, the wealthy with the impoverished, and one
race with another.' If this is the type of diversity our jury system strives
for, why are citizens who are not fluent in English-individuals termed as
those with limited English proficiency (LEP) 5-routinely disqualified or
excluded from fulfilling an essential civic responsibility?
In our court system, jurors are considered "fact finders" and, as such,
are responsible for ascertaining the truth in a controversy containing issues of fact.6 In a typical trial setting, jurors must be able to comprehend
and consider the relevant evidence presented,' evaluate the credibility of

1. See generally A.B.A. Div. FoR Pun. Eiuc., THE HISTORY OF TRIAl. BY JURY 1,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/j ury/moreinfo/dialoguepartl.auth
checkdam.pdf (describing the individual right of obtaining a trial by jury, and the important role it plays in American society).

2. Id.
3. Id. at 4 (explaining how the right to a jury trial now includes the right to have a jury
selected from a representative cross section of the community).
4. See generally id. (noting jury composition is intended to form a cross section of the
community).

5. An LEP individual is someone who speaks a language other than English as her
primary language and has a limited ability to read, write, speak, or understand English.
Frequently Asked Questions, LEP.Gov, http://www.lep.gov/faqs/faqs.html#OneQ7 (last vis-

ited Sept. 13, 2015).
6. Anne Bowen Poulin, The Jury: The Criminal Justice System's Different 62 U. CIN.

L. REV. 1377, 1390 (1994).
7. Cf id. (explaining juror understanding of legal concepts has been a contested issue
within trials).
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witnesses, 8 and decide the probability of certain events that have occurred-all through their own understandings of law and from material
facts presented to them by judges, witnesses and lawyers.' Unlike witnesses, defendants, or plaintiffs-each of whom have their own account
of the relevant facts-a juror must formulate their decision based on the
information presented to them during a trial."o To reach a confident
unanimous verdict, each individual juror must understand the substance
of the courtroom discourse and analyze the credibility and weight of the
evidence offered."
As illustrated, the role of the juror is extremely important. Statutes
that create overly burdensome language proficiency standards create
problems with the jury selection process. These standards limit, and often
times completely deny LEP individuals the opportunity to fulfill their
fundamental civic duty.12 Moreover, the absence of necessary juror interpretation programs throughout the U.S. continues to provide the courts
with "reasonable" justification for LEP exclusion. Instead of completely
disqualifying an individual for a linguistic limitation, federal and state
governments should advocate for LEP inclusion in all judicial proceedings. "Both LEP persons and English speakers alike benefit, as courts
often decide issues which affect the interests of both."" In addition, upholding the integrity of the entire justice system equally serves as motivation for why language access services must be provided in a
comprehensive manner, not merely isolated to one part of the legal proceedings. An effective interpreter program can mitigate this severe ine-

8. See generally Renee McDonald Hutchins, You Can't Handle the Truth! Trial Juries
and Credibility, 44 SETON HALL L. Riev. 505, 509 (2014) (describing the role jurors play in

determining the witness's credibility is a fairly modern notion).
9. See generally Role of the Jury, CrrlZENS INFO., http://www.citizensinformation.ie/
en/justice/courtroom/jury.html (last updated Feb. 5, 2014) (listing the rules applicable to
jurors during both civil and criminal trials).
10. See generally John P. Cronan, Is Any of This Making Sense? Reflecting on Guilty
Pleas to Aid CriminalJuror Comprehension, 39 AM. CIum. L. Riv. 1187, 1189 (2002) (explaining juror duties consist of weighing evidence, drawing factual inferences, and applying
relevant law instructed by the judge).
11. Cf id. (asserting jurors need to "decipher complex and lengthy instructions" in
making a decision).
12. See Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Language Disenfranchisementin Juries: A Call for
ConstitutionalRemediation, 65 HASTINGs L.J. 811, 815, 829-30 (2014) (arguing federal and
state English literacy requirements deprive LEP individuals from being afforded full citizenship rights like jury service).
13. ABA, STANDARDS FOR LANGUAGE AccEss IN Couirs 21 (2012), http://www
.americanbar.org/content/dam/abaladministrative/legal-aid-indigen tdefendants/1s sclaid
standards-forlanguage-access-proposal.authcheckdam.pdf.
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quality, but there are many obstacles that leave the LEP community with
much to desire. 1 4
This comment examines the inception of jury instructions and how
LEP jurors, especially those in minority communities, can accomplish the
purpose the instructions were designed to realize. By exploring the history of jury instructions and the initial development and evolution of jury
composition, the importance of complete inclusion of non-English speakers should be recognized as a fundamental right. Eliminating the distinction between language ability from other constitutionally protected
groups may lead to the recognition of a new cognizable class of protected
people. Further, this comment will examine the issues associated with
language interpretations and how courtroom proceedings can be modified to accommodate the LEP community, and it will provide guidance in
examining the issues associated with providing interpreters for LEP jurors by reviewing New Mexico's juror interpretation program.
II.

A.

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROLE OF THE JUROR

The Self-Informed Juror and Its Development

The exact origins of jury procedures have not been determined with
great precision." However, the first documented use of the term "juror,"
or self-informing juries, can be traced back to the 12th Century reign of
King Henry 11.16 During that time, self-informing "juries were viewed as
inquisitive bodies and jurors were allowed to question witnesses both
outside and inside the courtroom."" However, unlike the modern court

14. Rose, supra note 12, at 813. These obstacles include the Supreme Court's formalistic distinction of language and race discrimination. Id. In addition, societal assumptions
regarding how the ability to understand and speak English is necessary to effectively participate on a jury has perpetuated a lack of inquiry into the purpose of the language requirement and possibility of implementing language accommodations. Id.
15. See Wylie A. Aitken, Comment, The Jury Instructions Process-Apathy or Aggressive Reform?, 49 MARo. L. REv. 137, 138 (1965) (stating the historical formation of
juries and jury instructions has not been narrowed to a specific date).
16. See Steven Muhlberger, Law and Administration under Henry II, ORB, http://
163.238.55.65/textbooks/muhlberger/law andadmin.htmi (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (explaining the pivotal role King Henry 11 had on the establishment of the common law system). King Henry II has been cited as the father of the common law of England. Id.
"[Common law] means the indigenous system of principles, procedures, and precedents
that evolved in England and which is the basis for the legal systems of Britain, the USA,
most of Canada, and other English-speaking countries." Id.
17. ELLEN CIHILTON

THEI

&

PATRICIA HENLEY, PUB. LAw RESEARCH INST.,

IMPROVING

JURY SYSTEM 2 (2004), http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/plri/juryinst.pdf.
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system there was no formal trial or presentation of evidence.1 8 Jurors

were often chosen because they were either witnesses, or because of their
standing and ability to ascertain facts from the community." Without the
limitations imposed today, jurors had full discretion to obtain every conceivable fact in order to render a party innocent or guilty. 20 Often times
these facts were obtained by the individual juror's own investigatory
means. 2 1 If a juror needed additional information, they simply conferred
with any person within the community who had knowledge of the facts.22
Throughout these early days, the court was not concerned with regulating
this type of fact-finding process. 23 In fact, often times the jurors knew
significantly more about the facts of the case than the judge. 24 By the end
of the 15th century, however, fewer informed jurors and issues involving
witness credibility led to the eventual decline of the self-informed jury
system.25 These issues created loopholes that quickly developed into an
insurmountable weakness for the juror self-investigatory system.2 6

18. See John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View
from the Ryder Sources, 96 Coimm. L. REv. 1168, 1170 (1996) (noting jurors were required
to investigate the facts and consult people who were informed in the subject).
19. Id. "The hope was that a jury of the locality would contain witness-like persons
who would know the facts, or if not, that these jurors would be well positioned to investigate the facts on their own." Id.
20. See id. (inferring early jurors were more independent in their decisions since instructional trials were not common practice). "The medieval jury came to court not to
listen but to speak, not to hear evidence but to deliver a verdict formulated in advance."
Id.
21. See id. (illustrating the role of a juror which required them to be able to attain
facts from members of the community or conduct their own investigations).

22. Id.
23. See Daniel Klerman, Was the jury ever self-informing?, in 1 JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS
IN ENGLAND AN) EuRoPE, 1200-1700 Ti-iE, TRIAL IN HISTORY 58, 60 (Maureen Mulholland et al. eds., Manchester University Press 2003) (asserting in-court testimony was not
important).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 74 (describing how the concept of "self-informed jurors" began to fade
during the mid-15th century). Self-informed jurors ". . . were partly replaced by officials,
such as coroners, hundred bailiffs, and constables" who had specific knowledge about
cases. Id. In addition, due to the increased pressure to present more in-trial evidence
(because of the lack of availability of self-informed jurors), witnesses and prosecutors began to play a larger role, thus minimizing the importance of the self-informed juror. Id.
Witness credibility problems arose due to the lengthy period between the initial indictment
of a crime (the formal charge against a defendant) and the commencement of the actual
trial. Id. Specifically, trials were held every four years, which made it impossible for jurors
to remember pertinent facts of a case. Id.
26. See generally id. (describing some of the many problems that arose from the long
waiting periods in criminal cases).
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As the self-informing jury became less effective, the role of the juror
changed.2 7 Jurors began participating by listening to evidence presented
at trial. 2 8 Additionally, jurors were no longer selected for their knowledge about the facts, but rather, they were chosen because they were ignorant of them, forming expectations that they would be an unbiased
party. 29 Nevertheless, similar to the self-informing system, jurors were
not constrained solely to what was presented at trial and could still base
their verdict on their personal knowledge. 30 Limitations involving
outside evidence would not come to fruition for almost two hundred
years after this initial reform." Consequently, it was during this period
32
that jury instructions, limitations, and restraints were sought.
B.

The Role of the Jurorin the U.S. Court System

In the United States, the transition from an active jury, to a more passive one, necessitated an instructional process. 3 3 Initially, judges exercised control over jury instructions by influencing and regulating the
content and procedures of the trial, 34 while the jurors were to decide both
questions of fact and questions of law.35 These instructions were fraught
with abuse of judicial authority and consequently, a growing concern over
the level of competency of ordinary jurors lead to the adoption of restrictions. 3 6 An 1895 decision by the Supreme Court officially prohibited ju-

27. A.B.A. Div. voiR Pun. EDUC., supra note 1, at 2.

28. Id.
29. Langbein, supra note 18, at 1171.
30. A.B.A. Div. Fi Pun. Euuc., supra note 1, at 2; see also Klerman, supra note 23,
at 60 (explaining medieval juries were never fully self-informing since jurors also based
their ultimate decision on evidence presented at trial by attorneys and witnesses).
31. See A.B.A. Div. FOR Pun. Enuc., supra note 1, at 2 (noting the right of jurors to
base their opinions at trial on personal knowledge was a recognized right until the 17th
century).
32. See Stephan A. Landsman, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary
System, 44 Oino Sr. L.J. 718, 730-31 (1983) (explaining how trial mechanisms helped foster jury neutrality beginning in 17th century trials).
33. Langbein, supra note 18, at 1171.
34. Aitken, supra note 15, at 138.
35. Ellen Chilton & Patricia Henley, Jury Instructions:Helping Jurors UnderstandEvidence and the Law, 2004 IMPROVING TIE JURY SYSTEM 9, http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-

law/docs/plri/j uryinst.pdf.
36. See Aitken, supra note 15, at 138 (discussing the problems that led to the development of jury instructions included abuse of discretion of judges and bullying of juries);
Stephan Landsman, The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an UnappreciatedHistory, 44
HASTINGs L.J. 579, 607 (1993) ("The judiciary came to believe that the jury was incapable
of comprehending the new industrial reality. Judges also assumed that jurors were irremediably biased against corporate defendants. Based on these assumptions, judges sought to
curtail the jury's authority.").
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ries from deciding issues of law.37 The Court held judges solely
responsible for deciding issues of law, and limited juries to deciding issues
of fact.3 ' The Supreme Court's decision added more confusion than clarity for the courts.3
Judges had difficulty implementing this new change as they were concerned with issuing jury instructions while maintaining accurate legal language (legalese).4 0 They feared an appellate court would overturn their
decision if precise legal language was not used in the jury instructions.4 1
By 1938, the American Bar Association adopted minimum standards for
trial practice. 4 2 Still, this instruction process became a mere formality.4 3
Judge Robert L. Winslow"4 eloquently explained the practice:
After the argument to the jury, we judges don our robes and go forth
in the battle of justice v. evil with our 'Book.' Our part in the trial is
beginning, our script is set, the scriptural [sic] lesson for the day is
'negligence.' The language must not vary except that we might insert
the names of the parties. We must not, however, deviate from 'approved legal language.' Any desire to make the ritual understandable must be suppressed for we must correctly state the law even if it
is not understood. To make the script understandable would be to
risk reversal for an understandable statement would not be in 'approved legal language.'45

37. See Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 98-106 (1895) (holding a juror's duty is to
take the law as expressed by the presiding judge at trial and apply the law to the facts of
the case).
38. Aitken, supra note 15, at 138; see CHILTON & HENLEY, supra note 17 (claiming
states mandated judges to instruct the jury on the law they were required to apply).
39. See Aitken, supra note 15, at 139 (describing how judges' inability to explain the
law without legalese in juror instructions created more confusion than it alleviated).
40. Id. at 139.
41. Id.
42. Kenneth Dayton et al., Report of the Committee on Trial Practice, 63 ANN. RIT.
A.B.A. 551, 553 (1938). "[Alfter the evidence has been closed and counsel have concluded
their arguments to the jury, the trial judge should instruct the jury orally as to the law of
the case, and he may advise the jury as to the facts by summarizing and analyzing the
evidence and commenting upon the weight and credibility of the evidence or upon any part
of it, always leaving the final decision on questions of fact to the jury." Id.
43. Aitken, supra note 15, at 138.
44. LL.B., Stanford University Law School, 1949; Judge, Superior Court, Mendocino
County.
45. Robert L. Winslow, The Instruction Ritual, 13 HASTINGs L.J. 456, 456 (1962).
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The presumption remains that jurors will follow these instructions and
understand a judge's response to their question,4 6 when in reality, this is
not the case.
The implementation of jury instructions has evolved and serves as a
type of decisional framework to guide and narrow the scope of a juror's
application of the law to the facts.47 The underlying framework is based
on the instructions' intention to inform jurors of principles of law, burdens of proof, and standards for weighing evidence.4 8
III.

THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT: AN OVERVIEW
OF ITS IMPLEMENTATION.

Neither the U.S. government nor any explicit language in the Constitution declares English as the official language of the nation 4 9-although
currently, twenty-six states have adopted English as the official language.5 o Yet, to qualify as a juror, one must be able to read, write, speak,
46. Weeks v. Angelone, 528 U.S. 225, 226 (2000). "To presume otherwise would require reversal every time a jury inquires about a matter of constitutional significance, regardless of the judge's answer." Id.
47. See Cronan, supra note 10, at 1193 (stating the Supreme Court established that a
trial's judges role in instructing jurors is to direct the application of law accurately).
48. See generally id. at 1193-1994 (discussing different purposes for instructions juries
receive at various stages of a trial).
49. Rose, supra note 12, at 816; see U.S. CONT. (exemplifying the lack of an official
language requirement). But see English Language Unity Act of 2013, H.R. 997, 113th
Cong. 3 (2013) (proposing to declare English as the official language of the United States).
Although bills declaring English as the official language have been proposed, they have
never been passed. Rose, supra note 12, at 816-20. See generally Walter Hickey, One Map
That Shows Why English Will Never Be The Official Language Of The US, BUSINIESS INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2013, 4:47 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/one-map-that-proves-english-will-never-be-the-official-language-of-the-us-2013-9 (showing regions where nonEnglish speakers are among the highest numbers of the population). The language diversity of the United States is making it increasingly difficult to proclaim and maintain an
official language for the country. Id. The idea of English becoming the official language
will undoubtedly never come to fruition. Id.
50. Rose, supra note 12, 816-20; see, e.g., FLA. CONSTr. art. II, § 9 (declaring English as
the official language of Florida); HAW. CONST. art. XV, § 4 (designating both English and
Hawaiian as the official languages of Hawaii); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 4-1-404 (2010) (establishing English as the official language of Tennessee); VA. CODI ANN. § 1-511 (2005)
(adopting English as the official language of Virginia). States have also implemented statutes requiring jurors to be able to speak, read, and write in English. E.g., ALA. COiE § 1216-59 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.20.010 (2014); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 21-202 (2014);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-102 (2015); CAL. Civ. PiRoc. § 203 (1995); Corn. REv. STAT.
§ 13-71-105 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-163 (2015); IDAHlO CODE § 2-209 (2014); IND.
CODE § 33-28-5-18 (2015); IowA CODE § 607A.4 (2015); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 43-158 (2014),
proposed amendment by 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 333; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29A.080 (2015);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 494.425 (2014); Nam. REV. STAT. § 25-1601 (2003); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 500-A:7-a (2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 9-3 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-07
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and understand English, in order to serve on a jury panel in federal courts
and in many state courts.5 ' Specifically, federal courts disqualify potential jurors on the basis of language for two reasons. First, if the individual
is completely incompetent in the English language, the individual will be
disqualified from jury participation.5 2 Second, if the individual is not
completely incompetent, but is "unable to read, write, and understand the
English language with a degree of proficiency sufficient to fill out satisfactorily the juror qualification form" they will be disqualified.53 In practicality, the federal judicial system has implemented a high, if not
impossible, language efficiency standard for individuals with LEP to overcome.54 As strict as the federal standard may seem, it is still less demanding than standards implemented by some states.
A.

Proficiency Standards in State Courts

Assistant professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh, Jasmine B.
Gonzales Rose, studied every individual states' efficiency requirement
that must be satisfied for a citizen to qualify to serve as a juror. 56 This
state-by-state analysis found many stipulations directly conflict with constitutional guarantees. 57 Specifically, forty-one states have English language prerequisites that require "prospective jurors possess some level of
English language proficiency in order to serve on a jury panel."" The
(2015); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-810 (1962) (amended 1986); S.D. Comoli-D LAws § 16-3-10
(2015); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-1-105 (2008); Wyo. STA'r. ANN. § 1-11-101 (2015).
51. Rose, supra note 12, at 816-17. English is the language required in all official

proceedings of federal courts. Id.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (West 2015).
53. Id.
54. See Rose, supra note 12, at 816 (asserting the JSSA standard is a high bar to overcome causing the exclusion of those who cannot speak or write less than very well in
English).
55. See id. at 819 (comparing the federal language requirement with those of Louisiana, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont).
56. Id.
57. See generally id. at 834 (showing the discrepancies between Constitutionally guaranteed rights and rights implemented by state laws).
58. Id. at 818; e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-59(b)(3) (1975); ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.20.010(a)(6) (2014); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-202(B)(3) (2014); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-31-102(a)(3) (2015); CAL. Civ. PRoc. § 203(a)(6) (1995); COLo. REv. STAT. § 13-71105(2)(b) (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-217(a)(3) (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10,
§ 4509(b)(4) (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-163(b)(6) (2015); HAw. REv. STAT. § 6124(a)(4) (2014); IDAIO CODE § 2-209(1)(a) (2014); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 305/2(3) (1997);
IND. CoDE § 33-28-5-18(b)(2) (2015); IND. ST. Juy r. 5(d) (2001) (amended 2006); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 43-158(a) (2014), proposed amendment by 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 333; Kv.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 29A.080(2)(d) (2015); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 401(a)(3)
(2010); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 1211 (2015); Mo. CoDE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 8103(b)(2) (2006); MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 234A, § 4(3) (2015); Micii. Comp. LAWS
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study explains that states with the most restrictive language requirement
standards go beyond what is required by the federal standard." States
including Louisiana, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Vermont, explicitly mandate jurors must have the ability to read, write, speak, and understand English in order to serve on a jury.60 In contrast, the language set
forth in the federal standard does not define "the degree of proficiency"
one must have, but rather defers to the discretion of the sitting trial
judge."
States that have not officially declared an English language requirement for juror service may "be in the process of attempting to institute
such a requirement, or employ such requirements in practice." 62 For example, Texas's juror qualification statute states that a person is competent
to serve as a juror if that person "is able to read and write," but does not
identify that the literacy must be in English.6 3 Consequently, the Texas
§ 600.1307a(1)(b) (2009);

MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 808(b)(4) (2015); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 494.425(5) (2014); Nrn. REV. STA-r. § 25-1601 (2003); NEv. REV. STAT. § 6.010 (2015);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 500-A:6(III)(b)(2) (2014); N.J. SrA-r. ANN. § 2B:20-1(b) (2015);
N.Y. Juo). LAw § 510 (2015); N.C. GEN. S-r.Ar. § 9-3 (2014); N.D. CENT. ConE § 27-09.107(1)(b) (2015); Oi-no Cum. R.(C)(13) (1973) (amended 2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 22658 (effective Sept. 1, 2015); 42 PA. CONS. S-rAr. § 4502(a)(1) (1980) (amended 2001); 9
R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-9-1.1(a)(4) (2014); S.C. Coou ANN. § 14-7-810(2) (1962) (amended
1986); S.D. ConwIm LAws § 16-3-10 (2015); UTAII Coou ANN. § 78B-1-105(1)(d) (2008);
VT. STATr. ANN. tit. 4, § 962(a)(3) (2015); WASH. Riv. CoDE § 2.36.070 (1988); W. VA.
Coou § 52-1-8(b)(2) (2015); Wis. STAT. § 756.02 (2015); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-11101(a)(iii) (2015).
59. See Rose, supra note 12, at 819 (arguing some state statutes regulating juror requirements surpass federal standards).
60. See id. (recognizing these states as having the most restrictive juror language requirements); see also LA. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 401(A)(3) (2010) (equating sufficient knowledge of the English language with a juror's ability to read, write, and speak
English); 42 PA. CONs. STA-c. § 4502(a)(1) ("[E]very citizen . . . shall be qualified to
serve . . . unless such citizen is unable to read, write, speak and understand the English
language."); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-810 (asserting a juror must be able to read, write, and
speak English to serve); V-r. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 962(A)(3) (demanding jurors read, write,
speak, and understand English). These statutes in particular go above and beyond the
federal standard of English proficiency. Rose, supra note 12, at 819.
61. Cf id. at 822 (discussing state wide discrepancies in courtroom practices and how
ambiguous standards pose significant risks of excluding potential qualified jurors).
62. Id. at 821.
63. TEX. Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 62.102 (West 2005). But see id. § 62.109 (giving a judge
discretion to excuse someone from participating in a jury if it will prove to be difficult for
them to understand). English proficiency is not listed as a requirement, although in practice it has been implied as a silent requirement in Texas courts. See House Transcript, April
19, 2011, TEX. TRIB. (Apr. 19, 2011), http://www.texastribune.org/session/82R/transcripts/
2011/4/19/house (arguing the practice of determining literacy for a juror's eligibility is already presumed to mean literacy in English and this presumption has impacted the application of the Texas juror qualifications).
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House of Representatives proposed a bill in April 2011 to make a person's qualification for jury service to be based on one's ability to read and
write English." During the Texas House debate, advocates for the bill
stipulated that an English literacy requirement would not change the current practice of Texas courts already assuming the ability to read and
write is in English and not another language.6 5 Although the bill did not
pass in the Texas Senate, 6 6 this serves as an example of how proposed
legislation can effectively and indelibly limit the opportunities of future
civic duties of LEP individuals.
IV.

JUSTICE SYSTEM ACCESS FOR

LEP

INDIVIDUALS Is ESSENTIAL

Identifying a need for services to those with limited English proficiency, and enabling LEP individuals to have meaningful access to the
justice system including its obligations is a continuing struggle.6 7 Meaningful access to the justice systems means ensuring that these individuals
are afforded the same privileges and opportunities as every other U.S.
citizen." The issue becomes even more important in light of the country's current influx of immigrants 69 in border states (specifically, states
bordering Mexico) such as California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.7 0
Nearly two-thirds of the immigrant population entering Texas (and other

64. Tex. H.B. 1633, 82nd Leg., R.S. (2011).
65. See House Transcript, supra note 63 (explaining the current standard used by
judges is "whether a juror can read or write in English" to determine if the person is

qualified).
66. Id.
67. C.f Rose, supra note 12, at 831 (asserting that English literacy requirements restrict core citizenship functions for LEP citizens and those requirements should be examined with strict constitutional scrutiny).

68. Id.
69. See generally

CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS

IMMIGRATION

TEAM, THE FACTS ON IMMI-

GRATION TODAY (2014), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ImmigrationFacts-brief-10.23.pdf (listing facts on immigration in the United States) (last
visited Oct. 14, 2015); Kyle Rothenberg, Mississippi officers now required to learn Spanish
to better reach the community, Fox NEws LATINO (Feb. 25, 2015), http://Iatino.foxnews
.com/latino/news/201 5/02/25/mississippi-officers-now-required-to-learn-spanish-to-betterreach-community (describing a new program that teaches police officers conversational
Spanish since the Spanish/English language barrier has become a prevalent problem); Cristina Silva, Immigration Reform 2015: More Hispanics In US Schools, But They're Struggling To Keep Up, INT'L Bus. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015, 11:35 AM), http://www.ibtimes.com/
immigration-reform-2015-more-hispanics-us-schools-theyre-struggling-keep-1827574
(stating Hispanics have become the fastest growing ethnic group in U.S. public schools).
70. See Rose, supra note 12, at 862 (arguing juror interpretation programs can be
implemented to adapt to the growth of the LEP population in the United States); see also
Spanish Speaking State Statistics, STAT. BRAIN RES. INST. (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.statisticbrain.com/spanish-speaking-state-statistics (illustrating the percentage of populations
within each state that only speak Spanish). A little over 12% of the Texas population is
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parts of the United States) comes from Mexico.7 1 In 1990, citizens with
LEP's accounted for approximately 6% of the total U.S. population.7 2
The U.S. Census Bureau's 2011 American Community Survey found 25.3
million, or 9%,73 of individuals with LEP, both foreign and U.S.-born,
were living in the United States.74 This translates to an 81% increase in
the LEP population in a twenty-year period.
Geographically, a large
majority of the LEP population resides in the southern and eastern
states,7 6 with Spanish as the primary language. 7 The large number of
individuals speaking Spanish and other foreign languages 7" illustrates the
need for judicial interpreters. This is a critical issue, specifically because
our justice system promotes that every American citizen has a fair opportunity to participate. Fairness can only be achieved if the system enables
individuals with LEP the opportunity to fulfill their civic obligation of
juror service.

only Spanish speaking, with a majority of this population clustering in communities along
the Texas/Mexico border. Id.
71. ANN BEESON ET AL., CTR. I-Olt PuB. PoIcY PRIORIflES, IMMIGRANTs DRIVE THE
TEXAs ECONOMY: ECONOMIC BENEFIrs OF IMMIGRANTS TO TEXAs 2 (2014), http://

forabettertexas.org/images/EO_2014_09_PPImmigration.pdf.
"Texas is home to more
than 4.2 million immigrants. Texas immigrants come from numerous countries, with twothirds coming from Mexico, Canada, Central America, and the Caribbean. Of this group,
2.5 million are from Mexico. The remaining one-third is from Asia, Europe, Africa, South
America, and the Middle East. Of this group, the largest numbers come from India, Vietnam, and Germany (approximately 400,000 combined)." Id.
72. Monica Whatley & Jeanne Batalova, Limited English Proficient Population of the
United States, MIGRATION POL'Y INST. (July 25,2013), http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/limited-english-proficient-population-united-states#14.

73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id.
76. Id.
With a total of 4.8 million native-born LEP individuals nationwide, the states with the
largest native-born LEP populations were California (950,000 native-born LEP residents), Texas (930,000), and New York (450,000). Id. Additional states, whose native-born LEP populations were relatively small, yet made up a sizable share of their
total LEP populations included Montana (57 percent of the state's total LEP population), West Virginia (49 percent), Maine (45 percent), New Mexico (38 percent),
Alaska (37 percent), and North Dakota (36 percent).
Id.
77. See Camille Ryan, U.S. CENSus BUREAU, LANGUAGE USE IN THE UNITED
STATEs: 2011, at 1-2 (2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acs-22.pdf (listing Spanish and thirty-nine other languages spoken at home by NES from the 2011 American Community Survey).
78. See id.
79. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 12, at 825 ("The overrepresentation of Latinos in the
criminal justice system is even greater in communities with significant populations of LEP
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V.

IMPLICATIONS OF A JUROR LANGUAGE REQUIREMENT
ON THE JURY POOL

The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment's requirement for a defendant to be tried by an "impartial jury"-which was
eventually codified in the U.S. Codeso-means that every jury pool must
be a "random cross-section of the community."s" U.S. District Courts are
required to devise and operate a plan to randomly select jurors "from a
fair cross-section of the community in the district," without excluding any
person from service on account of race, color, national origin, religion,
sex, or economic status. 2 This ensures that every defendant is tried by a
random selection of persons representing the community in the district or
division where the court convenes, and not a "pool made of up of only
special segments of the populace."" Nonetheless, the Sixth Amendment's implicit guarantee to be tried by a jury of peers remains by the
wayside for LEP defendants in federal courts and in a majority of the
state courts.8 4 Although the process of jury composition cannot actively

Latinos, making the need for representative jury pools all the more important in these
regions.").
80. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-63 (West 2015). In 1968, Congress enacted the Jury Selection
and Service Act that codified the requirements, which declared that litigants are entitled to
a jury selected at random from a fair cross section of the community. Id.
81. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 422 (1991) (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474, 477 (1990)) (recognizing the Court's cases have held that the Sixth Amendment allows
a defendant to object to a venire not representing a fair cross section of the community);
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1979) (citing Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S., 522,
526-31, 538 (1975)) (stating exclusion of women resulting in jury pools not representative
of the community denies a defendant's rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Taylor, 419 U.S. at 527 (stating the Court has previously maintained the concept of
jury trial considers a jury drawn from a fair-cross-section of the community). The Sixth
Amendment states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to
a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed. . . ." U.S. CONs-r. amend. VI.

82. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-63.
83. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 422 (arguing Sixth Amendment case law allows defendants to object to a venire that is not a fair cross section of the community); Duren, 439 U.S.
at 370 (stressing states must be cautious when exempting broad categories of people from
jury service to avoid a violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right); Taylor, 419 U.S.
at 530, 538 (holding jury pools must not exclude distinctive groups in the community).
84. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1865 (prohibiting individuals from participating in juries if they
are unable to read, write and understand English); Rose, supra note 12, at 818 ("[F]ortyone states have juror statutes which require that prospective jurors possess some level of
English language proficiency in order to serve on a jury panel."). Potential jurors can be
disqualified or exempted based on inadequate English language proficiency in the overwhelming majority of states. E.g., ALA. CODE § 12-16-59 (1975); ALASKA SrAT.
§ 09.20.010 (2014); Aimz. Riy. SrAT. ANN. § 21-202 (2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-31-102
(2015); CAL. CIv. PROC. § 203 (1995); COLo. REv. STAT. § 13-71-105 (2015); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 51-217 (2015); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4509 (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-163
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include non-English speakers, they should not be automatically disqualified on the basis of insufficient proficiency in the English language.
In 2011, a U.S. Census Bureau study revealed English is a secondary
language in nearly 22% of U.S. homes (encompassing individuals ages
five and over)." Additionally, almost a quarter of that population is not
qualified to participate in jury service." This rather small percentage
may seem unproblematic, but when viewed in the context of a jury trial in
a minority community, the gravity of this limitation on jury selection becomes apparent. This problem can be illustrated by Hidalgo County,
Texas, where the percentage of individuals who do not speak English, or
do not speak it well enough, skyrockets to an astonishing 25%.88 It is
nearly impossible for LEP defendants to be judged by a jury consisting of

(2015); HAw. RnV. STAT. § 612-4 (2014); IDAHo Coon § 2-209 (2014); 705 1-L. Come.
STAT. § 305/2 (1997); INo. CODE § 33-28-5-18 (2015); INo. Sir. JURY r. 5 (2001) (amended
2006); IOWA CODE § 607A.4 (2015); KAN. STA''. ANN. § 43-158 (2014), proposed amendment by 2015 Kan. Sess. Laws 333; Ky. REV. STA'c. ANN. § 29A.080 (2015); LA. CODE
CizM. PRoc. ANN. art. 401 (2010); Mn. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 1211 (2015); Mo. CoDE ANN.,
CTs. & Juo. PROC. § 8-103 (2006); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 234A, § 4 (2015); Micit. CoMr.

LAws § 600.1307a (2009); Mo. Rnv. STAT. § 494.425 (2014); Nnm. Rnv. S'TAT. § 25-1601
(2003); Nv. Rnv. STAT. § 6.010 (2015); N.H. REv. STA-r. ANN. § 500-A:7-a (2014); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2B:20-1 (2015); N.Y. Jun. LAw § 510 (2015); N.C. GHN. STAT. § 9-3 (2014);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-09.1-07 (2015); Onio Cium. R. 24 (1973) (amended 2009); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 22, § 22-658 (effective Sept. 1, 2015); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4502 (1980) (amended
2001); 9 R.I. GEN. LAws § 9-9-1.1 (2014); S.C. CooE ANN. § 14-7-810 (1962) (amended
1986); S.D. Coinwio LAws § 16-3-10 (2015); U'rAii CooE ANN. § 78B-1-105 (2008); Vi'.
STATi. ANN. tit. 4, § 962 (2015); WAsi. REV. Coo § 2.36.070 (1988); W. VA. CODE § 52-18 (2015); Wis. STAT. § 756.02 (2015); Wyo. STAT'. ANN. § 1-11-101 (2015).
85. See generally Rose, supra note 12, at 818 (stating LEP persons are excluded from
jury participation in all federal courts and most state courts). Jurors "must be drawn from
a source fairly representative of the community." Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (citing Fay v.
New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 (1947)). The Court stated there was "no requirement that
petit juries actually chosen must mirror the community and reflect the various distinctive
groups in the population. Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition," but a defendant was constitutionally entitled to a jury which had been selected from
a cross section of eligible persons in the community at large without systematic and intentional exclusion or discrimination as to racial, religious, political, economic, geographical
or social status. Id.
86. RYAN, supra note 77, at 11.
87. Id. There are approximately 60.6 million people in the United States that speak
another language other than English at home. Id. Out of those 60.6 million, 13.6 million
people (many of whom do not speak any English) would be disqualified to serve on a jury.
Id.
88. Hidalgo County, Texas, Crry-DATA.coM, http://www.city-data.com/county/Hidal
goCounty-TX.html (last visited Sept. 12, 2015). This percentage is comprised by adding
percentages of people do not speak English well (12%) with those who do not speak En-

glish at all (13%). Id.
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a fair-cross-section of the community when such jurors are purposely excluded or excused from this civic duty. 8 9
"In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section
requirement, the defendant must first show that the group alleged to be
excluded is a 'distinctive' group in the community . . . ."'

Second, the

defendant must show that the representation of this group in a panel of
prospective jurors from which a jury is selected is not fair or reasonable,
relative to the number of such persons in the community.9 1 Finally, the
defendant must prove the "underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process." 92 The problem is trying to establish LEP individuals as a group that is a recognizable, distinct
class such as race, ethnicity or national origin." For the same reasons
these categories have been recognized as cognizable classes, so to should
limited English proficient individuals.
VI.

A.

CONSTITUTIONAL UPHEAVAL OF THE

LEP

COMMUNITY

The Supreme Court's FormalisticApproach and Standards of
Review

Currently, there is no Supreme Court precedent establishing LEP status as a fundamental right." As such, the Court has been reluctant to
classify the LEP community as a protected class worthy of the protections
afforded under the Equal Protection Clause." The Court has taken a
formalistic approach by distinguishing language from protected classes

89. See TEx. Gov'T CooE ANN. § 62.102 (West 2005) (requiring a person be able to
read and write to serve as a petit juror); id. § 62.109 (allowing a judge to disqualify a person
from jury service if that person has an inability to understand the proceedings). English
proficiency is not listed as a requirement, although in practice it has been implied as a
silent requirement in Texas courts. See House Transcript, supra note 63 (arguing the practice of determining literacy for a juror's eligibility already is presumed to mean literacy in
English and this presumption has impacted the application of the Texas juror
qualifications).

90. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
91. Id.

92. Id.
93. See Rose, supra note 12, at 852 (emphasizing that, while the Supreme Court has
not defined the requirements for establishing a distinct group for the purposes of a cross
section analysis, it has traditionally only recognized race, national origin, and gender as
such).
94. See id. at 837 (stating the Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of whether
language discrimination amounts to racial, ethnic, or national origin discrimination under
the Equal Protection Clause).
95. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1991) (refusing to consider
whether language ability bears a close enough relation to ethnicity to be afforded protection by the Equal Protection Clause).
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such as race, ethnicity, and national origin.9 6 The result is the LEP community is left without the constitutional recourse. The Court argues that
the LEP community is not identifiable by any particular race, ethnicity, or
national origin, thus they should not be afforded First Amendment protection so long as there is a race neutral explanation.97 Equally, on a
state level, this same line of reasoning is used by state legislatures to deny
LEP American's ability to participate in their civic responsibility of juror
service if the state can provide a rational basis for the requirementswhether implied or codified.98 State legislatures have extensive discretion and are generally entitled to a presumption of validity against an
attack under the Equal Protection Clause." LEP individuals relying on
language alone as a constitutional challenge to a state's juror exclusion
practice are only entitled to a rational basis review."oo Under this review,
laws that have the inevitable effect of treating some people differently
from others are constitutionally accepted, unless no rational relationship
between the action and a permissible state objective can be established.' 1 For a state's action to be validated under the highly deferential
rational basis standard, a court must merely conclude that the state's legislation is reasonably related to a legitimate state interest.' 0 2 Since it is
the most deferential standard of constitutional review, rational basis has
continually worked as a "rubber stamp" for state legislation. 10 3
In Hernandez v. New York,' 04 in a plurality opinion, the Court addressed the issue of juror exclusion during voir dire on the potential basis

96. See Rose, supra note 12, at 814 (arguing although it is impermissible to exclude a
citizen from jury service on the basis of race, ethnicity or national origin, LEP individuals
are allowed to be excluded from jury service despite the fact that doing so effectively excludes racial minorities); see also Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360 (refusing to consider whether
language ability bears a close enough relation to ethnicity to be afforded protection by
Equal Protection Clause).
97. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 360-61 (concluding a prosecutor who excluded potential jurors via preemptory strikes did so on a race-neutral basis because the decision was
based on the jurors' responses and demeanor during voir dire in addition to their language
abilities and not on an intention to exclude Latino or bilingual jurors).
98. See Rose, supra note 12, at 833 ("[W]ithout the recognition of language minorities
as a suspect class or the implication of an established fundamental right, the language requirement that jurors speak English is subject to rational basis review.").
99. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).

100. Id.
101. Id
102. Rose, supra note 12, at 833.
103. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAl.. L. REV. 481, 491
(2004) (pointing out that state classifications subjected to rational basis review receive
"rubber stamp" treatment from courts).

104. 500 U.S. 352 (1991).
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of language discrimination."os The Court, however, did not fully decide
the issue. 10 6 In Hernandez, the prosecutor struck two bilingual jurors
The prosecutor's main point of contention was
from the panel.'
whether the bilingual jurors had the ability to listen and follow the court
interpreter, and questioned whether the jurors would accept the translator as the final arbiter of the witnesses' responses."0 s The Court found
the prosecutor did not merely rely on their language ability, but instead
explained that the responses and behavior of the two individuals during
voir dire triggered him to "doubt their ability to defer to the official translation of Spanish-language testimony."10' The Court looked to the holding in Batson v. Kentuckyo that defined peremptory challenges violating
the Equal Protection Clause:
First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. [ ].
Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to
the prosecutor to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking
the jurors in question. [ ]. Finally, the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful
discrimination. [ ]."'
The explanation given by the prosecutor in Hernandez was deemed
sufficient to negate the underlying assumption that the prosecutor wanted
to prevent bilingual Latinos from serving on the jury.1 12 If the prosecutor
had not articulated this reasoning during voir dire, but rather relied on a
group stereotype rather than specific characteristics of the individual jurors, he would have violated the Court's holding in Batson.' 3 Rather
than confronting the issue of whether or not language discrimination,

105. Id. at 360.
106. See id. (avoiding the argument that a juror's language ability bore such a close
relation to ethnicity that it implicated the Equal Protection Clause because the PetitionerProsecutor did not rely solely on language in excluding the jurors).

107. Id. at 356-57.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 360.
110. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
111. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 358-59 (citations omitted). A Batson violation can be
established even when the defendant is not a member of the cognizable group because of
the harm caused by group-based discrimination to the judicial process as a whole and cognizable group(s) involved. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 413-15 (1991).
112. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 362.
113. See id. at 361 ("The prosecutor here offered a race-neutral basis for these peremptory strikes. As explained by the prosecutor, the challenges rested neither on the intention to exclude Latino or bilingual jurors, nor on stereotypical assumptions about
Latinos or bilinguals."). Nonetheless, a strong nexus to the race, ethnicity or natural origin
must be shown to rouse a Batson violation. Id. at 358-59.
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standing alone, is entitled to a strict scrutiny standard, the Court found
the three-step process in Batson restricted its consideration into the matter.11 4 Consequently, after the first prong of the Batson standard was not
met, the initial question of whether the defendant had made a prima facie
showing became a moot point in the Court's final decision.' 15
Once the prosecutor validated his explanation as race-neutral, the plurality did not need to directly address the issue begged: whether language
has an intimate relation to race, ethnicity, or natural origin that it could
be enveloped by a higher standard of review in terms of equal protection. 116 However, the plurality, recognized that in some cases-although
not in Hernandez itself-"proficiency in a particular language, like skin
color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection
analysis."' 1 7 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens agreed that "[a]n
explanation that is 'race neutral' on its face is nonetheless unacceptable if
it is merely a proxy for a discriminatory practice.""' The facts of Hernandez may not have been the best forum for deciding such an issue, as a
bilingual individual is not linguistically handicapped as an individual with
LEP." 9 Nevertheless, the fact the Court approved the reasoning that the
jurors may not be able to understand or listen implies the outcome would
be similar if applied to a case involving LEP jurors.
In legal application, the Equal Protection Clause is not intended to discern "equality" among persons or classes, rather, the standard is to provide "equal application" of the law.120 A violation of the Equal
Protection Clause requires a "discriminatory purpose."12 1 A facially neutral law will not be held unconstitutional merely because the result leads
to racially disproportionate impact.1 22 While disproportionate impact is

114. Id. at 359.

115. Id.
116. See id. at 364 (holding "Batson's treatment of intent to discriminate as a pure
issue of fact, subject to review under a deferential standard accords with our treatment of
that issue in other equal protection cases"). The Court reasoned that where a "trial judge's
findings ... turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those
findings great deference." Id.
117. Id. at 371.
118. Id. at 379 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
119. See id. at 371 ("Mere knowledge of [a foreign] language cannot reasonably be
regarded as harmful.").
120. See generally U.S. CONsr. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any
person . . . within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
121. Hernandez, 500 U.S at 359-60.
122. Id. at 361.
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relevant, it is not dispositive of a discriminatory purpose. 1 2 3 Establishing
proof of invidious intent is required to have a prima facie violation. 124
To succeed on a language-based equal protection claim, the plaintiff
must prove: first, there is an identifiable nexus between the language discrimination and race, ethnicity, or national origin, and second, the juror
language requirement is intended to discriminate against the class of persons to which the plaintiff belongs.1 25 Consequently, juror exclusion
based on race, ethnicity, or national origin is wholly impermissible, but
without attaching a language discrimination claim to one of the three categories above, the exclusion of LEP jurors fits in the contours of what is
constitutionally permissible.1 26
B.

Executive Support

The LEP community received acknowledgement on August 11, 2000,
when President Clinton signed Executive Order 13166, "Improving Access to Services for Persons with Limited English Proficiency" (LEP Executive Order).1 27 The order incorporates Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act and allows LEP speakers the right to have meaningful access to federally funded activities and programs (extending to federally funded state
programs).1 2 8 The order is detailed in the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) issuance of the policy guidance document, "Enforcement of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964-National Origin Discrimination

123. See id. at 361, 363 (explaining that the disproportionate impact on Latinos resulting from a prosecutor's jury selection criteria is relevant but does not answer the raceneutrality inquiry nor turn it into a constitutional violation).
124. See id. at 353 (explaining "proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose" is
required for an Equal Protection Clause violation).
125. C.f id. at 362 (finding no violation in the principal of race-neutrality because the
prosecutor's exclusion of jurors was not for the purpose of preventing bilingual Latinos
from serving).

126. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986); c.f Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 373 (explaining the nexus required between the use of a preemptory strike in jury selection and
discrimination on account of race).
127. Improving Access to Services for Persons With Limited English Proficiency, 65

Fed. Reg. 50,121, 50,121 (Aug. 16, 2000).
128. See id. (requiring all federal agencies to engage in a self-assessment of services to
improve access to LEP persons). This was effectively an extension to Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. See id. at 50,123 (elaborating on how these regulations add to the
already existing regulations of Title VI formulated by "virtually every executive agency
that grants federal financial assistance . . ."). The Executive Order requires Federal agencies to examine the services they provide, identify any need for services to those with LEP,
and develop and implement a system (without unduly burdening the agencies) to provide
those services so LEP persons can have meaningful access to them. Id. at 50,121.
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Against Persons With Limited English Proficiency" (LEP Guidance).12 9
The policy states "[tihe LEP Guidance sets forth the compliance standards that recipients of Federal financial assistance must follow to ensure
that their programs and activities normally provided in English are accessible to LEP persons and thus do not discriminate on the basis of national
origin in violation of Title VI's prohibition against national origin discrimination."' 3 0 The order also requires federal agencies to work to ensure that recipients of federal financial assistance, such as various state
institutions, provide meaningful access to their LEP applicants and
beneficiaries.'
The DOJ's Civil Rights Division "sent out a letter to chief justices in all
50 states, warning them that if their courts receive federal funds, as most
courts do, the courts must provide free interpreters in all court-related
matters."' 3 2 Unfortunately, the mandate was largely ignored because,
whether in practice or codified, many states have English language requirements in place for juror service qualification.1 3 3 The LEP community has not been recognized as an independent protected class, as such,
rational basis scrutiny governs, regardless of the LEP Executive Order.' 3 4
This undue and unbridled deferential treatment enables state legislatures
to continue to oppress LEP Americans and their inclusion on juries
nationwide.
VII.

RECOGNITION OF THE LEP COMMUNITY AS A NEW COGNIZABLE
CLASS OF PERSONS

A cognizable group has generally been referred to as those groups containing verifiable distinctive features,'
a definite composition with limits
as to what is included, and whose membership does not change "from day
to day or whose members can[not] be arbitrarily selected."' 6 "There

129. Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons,

67 Fed. Reg. 41,455 (June 18, 2002).
130. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.
131. Id.
132. Jude Joffe-Block, As need for court interpreters grows, who pays?, S. CAL. Pun3.
RADIO (May 14, 2012), http://www.scpr.org/programs/madeleine-brand/2012/05/14/26461/
as-need-for-court-interpreters-grows-who-pays.
133. See Rose, supra note 12, at 817 (outlining the official and unofficial sources of
English language juror requirements that result in exclusionary outcomes in state courts).
134. Id. at 833.
135. See NAT'I CTR. FOR STATE CouRrs, JURY MANAGERS' Toouox: A PRIMER ON
FAIR CRoss SECI-ION JURISPRUDENCE 2 (2010), http://www.ncsc-jurystudies.org/-/medial
Microsites/Files/CJS/What%20We%2ODo/A%20Primer%20on%2OFair%20Cross%2OSec
tion.ashx. (defining a cognizable group).

136. People v. Motton, 704 P. 2d 176, 181 (Cal. 1985).
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must be a commonality that defines the group, such as the sharing of
similar attitudes, ideas or experiences."" The National Center for State
Courts has stated that cognizable groups are those containing
immutable characteristics, especially gender, race, and ethnicity (Hispanic/Latino) and are recognized as valid groups under both Sixth
Amendment and Equal Protection Clause criteria. In addition to
gender, race, and ethnicity, some courts have found groups characterized by religious affiliation or national origin to be distinctive
groups under the Sixth Amendment. In most instances, however,
distinctive groups characterized by religious affiliation have such a
strongly cohesive community that the religious affiliation is similar to
ethnicity in terms of its cultural significance.' 3 8
Classifying language proficiency as a cognizable group is much more
difficult when physical features do not define the group. 3 9 Some courts
have attempted to rectify this problem by distinguishing what is, and what
is not, a cognizable group.
A.

The First Circuit's Definition of Cognizable Group

In Anaya v. Hansen, the First Circuit described a three-factor test that
must be satisfied by every cognizable group.14 0 To satisfy the first element of the test, the proponent must show the group is "defined and limited by some clearly identifiable factor."1 4 ' Next, the petitioner must
show a "common thread or basic similarity in attitude, ideas, or experience run[s] through the group." Finally, the proponent must show "that
there [is] a community of interest among the members of the group, such
that the group's interests cannot be adequately represented if the group is
excluded from the jury selection process."1 42 Under this definition, LEP
individuals appear to meet the credentials of a cognizable group. The
First Circuit analysis established in Hansen outlines how LEP individuals
are indeed a cognizable group.
Hansen requires a cognizable group to be defined and limited by an
identifiable factor.' 4 3 A limited English proficient community encompasses "individuals who do not speak English as their primary language

137. Id.
138. NAT'L OrR. FOR STA-TE Couris, supra note 135, at 2.
139. See Rose, supra note 12, at 835 (emphasizing the law fails to redress Spanish
language discrimination largely because it is not based on physical features the way discrimination manifests against blacks).
140. Anaya v. Hansen, 781 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1986).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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and who have a limited ability to read, speak, write, or understand English." 1 4 4 To further this contention, anthropological linguist Dr. Orville
Boyd Jenkins, identifies language as a prominent aspect of cultural identity, and that language in particular "is a primary and dominant identifying factor" distinguishing individuals "by their ethnolinguisticl4 5
uniqueness, [while] sharing a common self-identity."1 46 The fact that
LEP individuals are restricted by their inability to speak English closes
the possibility of the admission of new members. LEP membership is
innate. A person cannot simply unlearn English. Membership to this
group is preserved and isolated to those possessing this natural inability.
This fact alone closes admission into the LEP community and avoids any
transient characteristics that eviscerate a definition of a cognizable group.
The second element requires individuals in cognizable groups to be interconnected through a "common thread or basic similarity in attitude,
ideas, or experience." 1 47 The LEP community is unified by a lack of English proficiency, effectively preventing these individuals from participating in a fundamental civic duty.1 48 These individuals are deprived of
basic civil liberties, merely because they are not proficient enough in
speaking, reading, or fully understanding the English language.1 4 9 Just as
the broad categories of race, ethnicity, and national origin all contain subgroups, so too does the LEP community.so Diversity within a group
should not negate its common and unified front of experiencing the civic
obligations that many Americans take for granted.
Finally, one must prove there exists a community of interest among
members of the group and, if the group is prevented from the jury selection process, that the group's interests cannot be adequately represented.1 5 ' As previously mentioned, whether in statute or in practice,
minority communities are the groups most affected by English profi-

144. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 5.
145. Ethnolinguistics is "the study of language as an aspect or part of culture,
esp[ecially] the study of the influence of language on culture and of culture on language."
Ethnolinguistics,RANDOM HousiE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DicriONARY (2d. ed. 2001).
146. Orville Boyd Jenkins, What is a "People Group"?, ORVILIEJENKINS.COM, http://
orvillejenkins.com/ethnicity/peoplegroup.htmi (last updated Feb. 13, 2013).
147. Anaya, 781 F.2d at 5.
148. See Rose, supra note 12, at 816-19, 822 (asserting federal and state laws requiring
English proficiency to serve on juries prevents a significant number of LEPs from an essential right of citizenship).
149. Id. at 830 n.114.
150. See Whatley & Batalova, supra note 72 (finding the United States' LEP population is composed of various subgroups, such as age, ethnicity, race, gender, and socioeconomic status).
151. Anaya, 781 F.2d at 5.
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ciency requirements.' 5 2 This problem is especially prevalent in communities situated along the southern border of the United States where the
LEP population is largely concentrated.' 53 In these areas, selecting a jury
from a fair cross-section of the community, as required by the Sixth
Amendment, is not feasible.' 5 4 It is impossible for every individual with
Until corrected, jury pools and
LEP to be adequately represented. 5
jury panels will not accurately reflect the decisions of society as a
whole.' 56
When compared to other cognizable groups, the formalistic distinction
echoed by the Supreme Court seems rather arbitrary. A realist approach
to the issue is necessary to meet the demands of our nation's ever-changing social, demographic, and cultural transformations.' An individual's
proficiency in the English language should not prevent them from exercising important rights, and although the LEP community is not currently
considered a cognizable group, they deserve similar protections. At least
one state, New Mexico, shares this similar belief.'
VIII.
A.

ADDRESSING LEP SPEAKERS IN A JUSTICE SYSTEM:
THE NEW MEXICO MODEL

The Right to Serve on a Jury

New Mexico is the only state in the country to fully accommodate nonEnglish speakers, mandating interpreters for LEP jurors.15 9 The New
Mexico Constitution was adopted on January 21, 1911.160 Article VII,

152. Kevin R. Johnson, Hernandez v. Texas: Legacies of Justice and Injustice,
CANo-LATINo L. REv. 154, 190 (2005).

Ciii-

153. See id. at 184-85 (providing examples of minority underrepresentation in grand
juries due to language requirements for jury service in areas near the U.S./Mexico border).
154. See Rose, supra note 12, at 816-17 (arguing English jury service requirements
preclude many people in LEP-heavy areas from serving on juries, thus creating juries that
are not representative of the community).
155. See id. 824 (contending English requirements for jury service in LEP-heavy areas
create non-representative juries); see also Farida Ali, Multilingual Prospective Jurors: Assessing CaliforniaStandards Twenty Years after Hernandez v. New York, 8 Nw J.L. & Soc.
Pot'Y 237, 259 (2013) (arguing language classification requirements used to prohibit multilingual jurors produce juries that do not adequately reflect the population).
156. Rose, supra note 12, at 816-17.
157. See id. (stating English language jury service requirements that preclude Latinos
from being on juries ignore the fact that Latinos are the largest and fastest growing minority group in the United States).
158. See N.M. CONsTr. art. VII, § 3 (protecting a citizen's right to serve on a jury regardless of an inability to speak, read, or write the English language).
159. Kelly James, NM District Court Accused of Segregating Juries, MYFIIGI-PLAINS
.Com (Oct. 6, 2014, 10:03 PM), http://www.myhighplains.com/story/d/story/nm-districtcourt-accused-of-segregating-juries/69177/wN3WBe3sI kKg8sC911TWHA.
160. N.M. CONsT. art. VIl, § 3.
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Section 3 provides that "[t]he right of any citizen of the state to . . . sit
upon juries, shall never be restricted, abridged or impaired on account
of . . . inability to speak, read or write the English or Spanish languages.. . ."161 Article II, Sections 14 and 18 of the New Mexico Constitution, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,
protect the right of the accused to an impartial jury composed of a representative cross-section of the community.16 2 Together, these declarations
serve as the logical basis that enables all LEP individuals to serve on juries. The New Mexico Supreme Court explains that the right to serve on
a jury panel is a protected right to be enjoyed by every citizen, even nonEnglish speaking individuals.' 63 As a result, New Mexico's large population of Hispanic citizens,1 64 many of whom are not proficient in English,
are afforded the right to serve on a jury.1 65 New Mexico courts are required to provide a translator for individuals with LEP, and typically extend these accommodations to those who speak languages other than
Spanish, such as speakers of Native American languages.1 6 6 Providing
language access services does not solely benefit the LEP individual.
Rather, competent language access services can also promote the administration of justice by ensuring the integrity of the fact-finding process,
accuracy of court records, and efficiency in legal proceedings.' 6 7
This right, however, is not absolute and must be weighed in favor of the
defendant's other constitutional rights, such as the right to a speedy trial
as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.' 6 8 The

161. Id. As opposed to the U.S. Constitution which leaves language concerns and
protections open-ended and at the mercy of the majority in terms of legislation. See U.S.
CONsT. (omitting any mention of language concerns or protections).
162. State v. Aragon, 784 P.2d 16, 17-18 (N.M. 1989); see J.E.B. v. Alabama ex. rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994) (reaffirming commitment to an impartial jury).
163. N.M. SUPREME COURT, NON-ENGLISFI SPEAKING JUROR GUIDEUNEs 3 (2000),
https://www.nmcourts.gov/newface/court-interp/guidelinesandpolicies/New%20Mexico%

20Guidelines%20for%20NES%20Jurors%2008.pdf?uid=05.17.2013.
164. See QuickFacts Beta, U.S. CENsus BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045214/00,35 (last visited Oct. 3, 2015) (stating 46.3% of New Mexico's population
is Hispanic or Latino).

165. See State v. Samora, 307 P.3d 328, 332 (N.M. 2013) (holding excusal of a Spanishspeaking prospective juror who had difficulty understanding the English language violated
the juror's state constitutional right to perform jury service).
166. Id. "[I]nconvenience alone will not suffice" to overcome the state constitutional
right for a non-English-speaking citizen to perform jury service; "a trial court cannot excuse a juror on the basis of an inability to speak, read, or write the English or Spanish
languages' absent a showing that accommodating that juror will create a substantial burden." Id.
167. See generally Edward L. Chavez, New Mexico's Success with Non-English Speaking Jurors, 1 J. CT. INNoVATION 303, 304 (2008) (arguing juries need to truly reflect the
diversity of their community since they have great power and responsibilities).

168. Id. at 306.
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New Mexico legislature also developed the Non-English Speaking Juror
Guidelines to assist the judiciary with incorporating LEP citizens into the
juror selection process.1 69 These guidelines serve as an educational guiding tool and are not mandatory directives that must be followed in all
cases.' 7 0 Because individual jurisdictions have unique needs and limitations, a trial judge may also consider the feasibility of such assistance using their discretion to make every reasonable effort to accommodate
prospective jurors' language difficulties."' These decisions are made on
a case-by-case basis, as some courts do not have the resources available to
provide an interpreter, regardless, the presiding judge must make every
reasonable effort to accommodate a prospective juror's language

deficiencies.172
B.

What Constitutes Reasonable Effort?

In determining what constitutes "reasonable efforts," a reviewing court
will examine the trial courts actions in light of several factors:
The steps actually taken to protect the juror's rights, the rarity of the
juror's native language and the difficulty that rarity has created in
finding an interpreter, the stage of the jury selection process at which
it was discovered that an interpreter will be required, and the burden
a continuance would have imposed on the court, the remainder of
the jury panel, and the parties. It must be emphasized, however, that
inconvenience alone will not suffice; a trial court shall not excuse a
juror on the basis of an 'inability to speak, read or write the English
or Spanish languages' absent a showing that accommodating that juror will create a substantial burden or otherwise fall within the exception provided within Article VII, Section 3 itself.'17 3
The deference given to the judge does not allow for a strict and standardized analysis, but it allows a court to defend its reasons for a possible
excusal of a juror based on language limitation on a case-by-case basis.'
For example, merely stating that an interpreter is unavailable will not be
a sufficient reason to excuse a non-English-speaking juror."' The judge's
discretion must be based in fact in order to provide an appellate court
"insight into what the judge may or may not have done to remedy the

169. N.M. SUPREME COURT, supra note 163, at 3.

170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.

173. State v. Rico, 52 P.3d 942, 945 (N.M. 2002).
174. See id. (discussing the factors reviewing courts can consider when determining
whether dismissal of an LEP individual was constitutional under New Mexico law).
175. State v. Samora, 307 P.3d 328, 332 (N.M. 2013).
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situation."1 76 Additionally, if deemed appropriate, the trial judge can
postpone trial until a court interpreter is available, or, if postponement
would be unreasonable, the judge may excuse a prospective non-English
speaking juror, provided that the excused prospective juror is recalled for
jury selection for the next scheduled trial.177
C.

Eligibility Requirements of the JudicialInterpreter

To maintain the integrity of the court system," the New Mexico judiciary clearly defines the scope and role of the interpreter.1 79 This is evidenced by guidelines promulgated by extensive regulations and detailed
certification procedures. 8 0 For example, in addition to traditional interpreter certification requirements, the strict standards of the New Mexico
courts require interpreters to acquire additional certifications approved
by the state."' As such, merely possessing a language certificate in a
particular language is not sufficient to qualify as a judicial interpreter.' 8 2
Courts look at several factors to determine an interpreter's courtroom
eligibility, including the interpreter's educational background and certifi-

176. Id.
177. N.M. SUPREME COURT, supra note 163, at 4. By recalling jurors who were excused solely because of a language limitation New Mexico courts assure citizens of their
right to serve on a jury. See Samora, 307 P.3d at 331 (holding dismissal of a non-English
speaking juror violated the juror's rights under the New Mexico Constitution).
178. See Rose, supra note 12, at 824, 830 (asserting that imposing language requirements and having racially unrepresentative juries has A detrimental effect on the integrity
of the legal system while allowing NES jurors to serve with the assistance of interpreters
promotes confidence in the legal system).
179. See generally N.M. SUPREME COur, supra note 163, at 6 (establishing standards
and emphasizing the demanding and sensitive nature of the services provided by the
court's interpreters).
180. See generally Rose, supra note 12, at 854-55 (stating the inclusion of LEP jurors
in the New Mexico jury system has been lauded as providing the fairest jury of defendants'

peers and embodies fairness).
181. See generally N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-3(B) (1985) (dictating a court must appoint an interpreter for LEP individuals); Court Interpreter Certification, N.M. Ora. FOR
LANGUAGE
AccEss, http://nmcenterforlanguageaccess.org/cms/en/training/court-interpreter-certification (last visited Oct. 5, 2015) (outlining the requirements an individual
must complete to attain interpreter certification); Certificate Programs, N.M. CGr. Io
LANGUAGE ACCEss, http://nmcenterforlanguageaccess.org/cms/en/training/certificate-programs (last visited Oct. 5, 2015) (describing the certification program).
182. See Letter from Pam Sanchez, Statewide Program Manager, Language Access
Services, to Interested Parties on Becoming a Certified Court Interpreter in New Mexico
(Jan. 2014), http://www.nmcourts.gov/newface/court-interp/files/Becoming.a-CertifiedCourt_1nterpreterinNewMexicoDecember2014.pdf?uid=12.27.2013 (outlining the additional requirements to becoming a Certified Court Interpreter in New Mexico).
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cations acquired in their language of expertise.1 8 3 New Mexico mandates
a policy requiring every judicial interpreter to be certified by a government-approved program.1 84 Every applicant must enroll in a certification
program offered by the New Mexico Center for Language Access (NMCLA), a program administered by the Administrative Office of the
Courts (AOC).'" The NMCLA offers three distinct certifications: Court
Certified Interpreter (CCI), Justice System Interpreter (JSI), and Language Access Specialist; incidentally, the Court certification and the Justice System certification fall under the Justice System Interpreter
Program (JSI Program).1 86 A court certified interpreter is specifically allowed to operate within courts and interpret for jurors during the trial
process.'8
Following the completion of the JSI Program, interpreters
must show their proficiency in the English language by successfully completing various exams comprised of multiple-choice, written, and oral
questions.' 88 The exams demand a fairly high level of skill in English to
pass the minimum recommended requirements.'" Only interpreters certified through these programs are eligible to operate as interpreters

183.

See

NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE

COURTS,

COURT INTERPRETING QUALIFICATIONS

1

(2006), http://www.ncsc.org/-/media/Files/PDF/Education%20and%20Careers/
State%20Interpreter%2OCertification%202/Qualifications.ashx (discussing qualifications
that individuals should have before attempting to become certified court interpreters in
federal or state courts). The National Center for State Courts classifies professional court
interpreters as "individuals who possess educated, native-like mastery of both English and
a second language; display wide general knowledge, characteristic of what a minimum of
two years of general education at a college or university would provide; and perform the
three major types of court interpreting: sight translation, consecutive interpreting, and simultaneous interpreting." Id. These are baseline prerequisites before attempting to become a certified court interpreter in federal or state courts. Id.
184. See generally Court InterpreterCertification,supra note 181 (describing the different steps an individual must complete to obtain a court interpreter certification).
185. Letter from Pam Sanchez, supra note 182.
186. See generally Court InterpreterCertification,supra note 181 (describing the different steps an individual must complete to obtain a court interpreter certification); Certificate
Programs, supra note 181 (outlining the available certificate programs). The distinction
between a court certified interpreter and a justice system interpreter is the scores required
to pass examinations. Id. To be certified as a court interpreter a score of 80% or above on
the written exam is required to register for the oral Simultaneous Exam. Id A score of
70% or above on the simultaneous exam is required to register for the Oral Consecutive
and Sight Translation Exams, each requiring a score of 70% or above for certification. Id.
Whereas, Justice system interpreters must pass with a score of 80% or above on the written
exam and attain between 55% and 69% in all three oral examinations to be added to the
New Mexico registry of Justice System Interpreters. Id.
187. See N.M. SUPREME COURT, supra note 163, at 5 (stating all courts should use
court interpreters during jury selection, trial, and deliberation proceedings).
188. Letter from Pam Sanchez, supra note 182.

189. Id.
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'

within New Mexico's justice system.' 90 This provision ensures that every
interpreter has been properly trained and educated to meet the standards
set by the state, while effectively affording individuals with LEP the opportunity to participate in trials.19
In situations where an interpreter is necessary, courts must first attempt to obtain a certified interpreter as required by New Mexico law.' 9 2
Non-certified court interpreters cannot be used for a juror in criminal
trials, evidentiary hearings, or guilty or no-contest plea proceedings if incarceration is possible under statute or ordinance.' In addition, this restriction also applies to civil trials and evidentiary proceedings.' 94
However, there is an exception. A court cannot hire a non-certified
interpreter unless "the appointing authority has made diligent efforts to
obtain a certified interpreter and has found none to be reasonably available in the judicial district."'
Courts must refer to the list of certified
interpreters provided by the AOC.' 9 6 If the court cannot locate a courtcertified interpreter, the court must contact AOC for assistance in locating a certified interpreter.' 9 7 If a certified court interpreter cannot be
located, efforts will be made by the courts to identify a JSI from the AOC
Registry of Justice System Interpreters.' 9 ' If both of these avenues have
been exhausted and the court has maintained a diligent, good faith effort,

190. See generally id. (describing the mandatory formal steps that individuals inter-

ested in becoming certified court interpreters must take).
191. Mission and Values, N.M. CTR. FOR LANGUAGE Acciss, http://nmcenterforlangu
ageaccess.org/cms/en/about/mission-and-values (last visited Oct. 5, 2015).
192. N.M. ST'AT. ANN. § 38-9-3 (2007); id. § 38-10-3(A).
193. N.M. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE CouiRrs, COURT INTERPRETER STANDARDS OF
PRAcrlCE AND PAYMENT Poiu1cm13s 7 (2012), http://www.nmcourts.gov/newface/court-in
terp/guidelinesandpolicies/Practice-and-PaymentPolicies 2012.pdf?uid=05.17.2013.
194. Id.
195. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-3(B). See generally id. § 38-9-3 (maintaining the court
must provide the appropriate interpreter for any person who needs an interpreter, and
choose a certified interpreter from the list provided).
196. N.M. ADMIN. OiFIcu oiF rm CouiRs, supra note 193, at 6.
197. Id.
198. See id. (emphasizing the court must be diligent in finding a certified or Justice
System Interpreter before the court can consider other alternatives if neither can be
found). "Certified Court Interpreters and JSI interpreters work throughout the justice system and provide language access services in, as well as outside, the courtroom." Certification Programsin New Mexico, N.M. Cr. FOR LANGUAGE AccEss, http://nmcenterforlang
uageaccess.org/cms/en/training/language-access-specialist-certification (last visited Oct. 16,
2015). JSIs are certified interpreters that ensure that non-English speakers who become
involved with the New Mexico justice system, civil or criminal, have culturally and linguistically appropriate services available to them. See generally Paula Couselo-Findikoglu,
Making a Difference, N.M. OTrR. FOR LANGUAGE AccEss, http://nmcenterforlanguageaccess.org/cms/images/pdflNMCLA-NEWSLETTER-MAR1 1.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2015)
(stating more than 36% of New Mexico residents speak a language other than English at
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a court may then appoint a language access specialist or less qualified
non-certified court interpreter. 199 Nevertheless, the court must still consult with the AOC prior to retaining a non-certified interpreter.2 0 0
Before appointing a court interpreter to provide interpretation services
to a case participant, the court must qualify the interpreter according to
Rule 11-604 of the Rules of Evidence. 20 ' Consistent with the obligation
of reasonable effort, the court must qualify the interpreter to ensure their
proficiency of communicating effectively with the officers of the court
and the person for whom they are interpreting.2 0 2 However, before qualifying a JSI or other less qualified non-certified court interpreter, the
court, on record, will investigate the interpreters competency and skills
and the specific needs of the case participant requiring interpretation services.20 Additionally, the court will look into any potential conflicts of
interest the interpreter may have 204 to alleviate any concerns with judicial
integrity.205

D.

Criticisms of the Judicial Interpreter

The main concern regarding judicial interpreters is that they may inappropriately participate in con?dential jury deliberations. 206 This apprehension over the presence of an interpreter, or what is seen as a
"thirteenth juror," is based on the conjecture that an interpreter's presence could destroy the integrity and secrecy of jury deliberations, and
negatively impact the defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial by
jury. 207 Although a legitimate concern, it is no different than the already

home and the need for linguistic assistance is essential to provide people a chance to be
understood in the justice system).
199. COURT INTERPRETER RuuBs § 1-103(C)(4) (2012), http://www.thirddistrictcourt
.com/core/scripts/wysiwyg/kcfinder/upload/files/CourtInterpreters rules 01012013.pdf.
The Language Access Specialist certification program is designed to train and certify bilingual judiciary employees who are called on to provide language access services as part of
their regular work outside the courtroom. See generally Certification Programs in New
Mexico, supra note 198 (emphasizing Language Access Certification provides services for
NES outside the courtroom and for non-jailable offenses inside the courtroom).
200. Couwr INTERPRETER RULES, supra note 199, § 1-103(C)(4).

201. Id. § 1-103(E)(1).
202. N.M. ADmnN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, supra note 193, at 7.
203. CouRT INTERPRETER RULES, supra note 199, § 1-103(E)(1)(a).

204. Id.
205. See generally id. § 1-103(C)(4) (stressing the court is obligated to put on the record that the non-certified interpreter has fulfilled the requirements of the rules, including
that the interpreter has adequate knowledge and skills to translate and that the interpreter
possesses a community license from the New Mexico Regulations and Licensing
Department).
206. Rose, supra note 12, at 858, 863.
207. State v. Pacheco, 155 P.3d 745, 749-50 (N.M. 2007).
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inherent risks associated with each of the selected jurors. 2 0 8 All jurors
must take an oath 209 and whether or not this oath provides a decision
cleansed from outside influences may not be known for certain. Similarly, preceding the excusal of the jury for deliberations, all interpreters
are required to take an oath prior to providing any interpretation services
for jurors. 2 10 The New Mexico Supreme Court clarified the process of

jury deliberations and the interpreter's role in State v. Pacheco.2 11 The
court specified the trial court must administer an oath, on the record, and
in the presence of the jury, instructing the interpreter not to participate in
the jury's deliberations.2 12 The judge instructs the interpreter not to interfere with deliberations in any way by expressing any ideas, opinions, or
observations that the interpreter may have during deliberations and is
strictly limited to interpreting the jury deliberations to the LEP juror.2 1 3
The record must reflect the identity of the interpreter, identify their credentials, and make a determination of whether or not he or she understands the instructions given to them.21 4 Furthermore, the trial court
must also give an instruction to the jury about the interpreter's role during deliberations.2 1 5
Following the deliberation process, "but before the verdict is announced, the trial court is required to ask the interpreter on the record
whether he or she abided by the oath not to participate in deliberations,"2 1 6 and their answer officially becomes part of the record.2 17 in
concluding, the trial judge must instruct the interpreter not to divulge any
portion of the jury deliberations pending the close of the case.2 18 If there
is any doubt as to the conduct of the interpreter during deliberations, a
request to question the jurors can be made to discover any improper conduct that may have occurred. 2 19 New Mexico established appropriate

208. See generally Rose, supra note 12, at 861 (specifying jurors do not make jury
verdicts as individuals, but as a collective, and that any misunderstandings or influences
within the jury room can be dealt with amongst the jurors).
209. Ti x. CRIM. PRoc. CODE ANN. art. 35.22 (West 2013 & Supp. 2014)
210. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-10-8 (1985); N.M. SUPREME CoURT, supra note 163, at 7.
211. 155 P.3d at 751.
212. N.M. SUPREME COURT, supra note 163, at 7; see Pacheco, 155 P.3d at 751 (reasoning interpreters are officers of the court and the sworn oath requires the interpreter to
follow the court's orders and instructions).
213. N.M. SUPREME Couwr, supra note 163, at 7-8. These instructions are stated on
the record, as is the interpreter's understanding of the instructions. Id.
214. Pacheco, 155 P.3d at 754.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See N.M. SUPREME COURT, supra note 163, at 8.
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methods to preserve any error on record that can be attributable to the
interpreter.22 0

IX.
A.

THE COST OF NEW MEXICO'S INTERPRETER SYSTEM

FinancialResponsibilities of the State

Every state-endorsed program shares at least one commonality-support through government aide. To operate effectively, these programs
must be adequately funded to meet and serve the needs of its citizens. 221
In general, state governments operate through various state departments,
each tasked with a specific duty to ensure the state is running in an efficient manner. 222 A state's finance department, although specific functions vary in scope and detail from state-to-state, is primarily responsible
for balancing the state budget and for providing fiscal oversight to state
agencies.223 Because state resources are limited, finance departments are
typically conservative when providing monetary aide to state-run programs. 224 Often times this results in underfunded programs, unable to
provide sustainable services to meets the demands of the state's citizenry.
This is one of the primary problems facing New Mexico's judicial interpreter program. New Mexico is a state with a diverse populace that requires effective interpreter assistance, however, the program is struggling
because its current budget does not reflect society's current demand. 2 2 5
B.

Additional Program Funding is Necessary

As population increases so does the demand for judicial resources. In
New Mexico, the growing populace has created a greater need and demand for more judicial interpreters. This growth presents a two-fold
problem for the program's funding issue. First, as judicial activity (hearings and trials) increases, more government money is spent on interpreter

220. See Pacheco, 155 P.3d at 754 (requiring trial courts to conduct oaths, among
other types of procedure, on record).
221. See generally, New Mexico Department of Finance and Administration, http://
www.nmdfa.state.nm.us/ (last updated Nov. 5, 2015) (explaining the various goals and responsibilities pertaining to the state finance department and how the department serves
the interests of the citizens through responsible oversight to government agencies).
222. Id.
223. See id. ("The Mission of the Department of Finance and Administration is to . .
provide budget direction and fiscal oversight to state agencies and local governments ...
and [to] ensure every tax dollar is spent wisely.").
224. Id.
225. Fernanda Santos, As the Demand for Court Interpreters Climbs, State Budget
Conflicts Grow as Well, N.Y. TIMES (June 14,2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/us/
as-the-demand-for-court-interpreters-climbs-state-budget-conflicts-grow-as-well.html?_r
=0.
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fees. Second, since more judicial resources are being used, the availability of current resources becomes much more limited, resulting in a
greater demand for interpreters. The effect is that the government must
hire and pay more interpreters. Typical fees for judicial interpreters include an hourly wage of $47, and additional expenses such as reimbursement per diem payments for travel time and hotel accommodation.22 6 In
response to this persistent problem, the AOC (the judicial interpreter
funding agency) annually requests a budget increase from the state's financial governing authority, the New Mexico State Board of Finance.2 2 7
Although the board has largely granted these requests-as the budget has
nearly doubled over the past eleven years2 2 8 -the program is still severely underfunded to meet the current demands of New Mexico's growing population.2 2 9 Jocelyn Samuels, Assistant Attorney General of the
DOJ's Civil Rights Division, weighed in on the issue by asserting that
"states ha[ve] a civil rights obligation" 23 0 to fund the increasing costs of
court interpreters and "pleading poverty" is not an excuse to shield state
courts from compliance. 2 31 Barbara J. Vigil, Chief Justice of the New
Mexico Supreme Court, said:
Under its current budget, the judiciary is unable to provide adequate
juror pay and interpreters for those court participants with limited
English proficiency. Every juror in New Mexico should receive at
least the minimum wage for jury service, and every New Mexican has
a constitutional right to participate in our justice system regardless of
his or her ability to speak, read or write English or Spanish.2 32
When balancing the interests between conserving state resources and allocating additional funds necessary to achieve effective interpreter assistance, Assistant Attorney Samuels said, "[w]e recognize that there are

U.S. Couwns, FEDERAL COURT INTERPRETEIR
30-31 (2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
FederalCourts/Interpreter/federal-court-interpreter-orientation-manual.pdf (stating court
interpreters are paid based on a fee schedule that can be negotiated by the court interpreter and the interpreter is entitled to reimbursement for travel beyond a thirty-mile radius of their normal assigned duties).
227. Santos, supra note 225.
228. See id. (stating the budget has increased since 2004 from $4.2 million to $7.4
million).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Barbara J. Vigil, Reader View: Courtsneed more money to do their job, SANTA FE
NEW MEXICAN, (Feb. 28, 2015 9:00 PM), http://www.santafenewmexican.com/opinion/
my-view/reader-view-courts-need-more-money-to-do-their-jobarticle_487bead-a25-511
4-8bba-a32219959bcf.html#user-comment-area.
226. Id.; see ADMIN. OFFIcE or unii
ORIENTATION MANUEL AND GLOSSARY at
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financial constraints, but . . . failure to comply involves costs as well." 23 3
These costs involve exhausting additional judicial resources by burdening
appellate courts with issues based on mere procedural deficiencies. 23 4
These figures seem less troubling given New Mexico's judiciary budget
comprises just under 3% of the state's overall budget.23 5
C.

Potential Solutions to the Problem

New Mexico's interpreter program needs to be restructured.23 6 Cur
rently, the program allocates funds between interpreter, juror and witness
fees.237 Restructuring the allocation of funds has been a primary goal for
many lobby groups.2 38 These groups contend that in order to meet the
monetary demands of supporting additional judicial interpreter resources, alternative options must be explored.2 39 One possible solution
involves developing a separate funding stream exclusively for judicial interpreters. 24 0 As Esther Navarro-Hall, chairwoman of the National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators, explains, "[w]e
shouldn't have to be pitted against jurors and witnesses every year at the
end of the fiscal year." 24 1 Because both of these competing interests are
equally important, establishing separate funds should alleviate some of
this tension.
In recent years, the National Center for State Courts proposed a federal grant that would assist state interpreter programs by providing monetary aide in areas such as certification and training.24 2 Similarly, in 2009,
Senator Herb Kohl (D-WI) introduced Senate Bill 1329243 that would

233. Santos, supra note 225.

234. Id.
In places like Ohio, Kansas and Illinois, where immigrants speaking many different

languages have settled in recent years, the courts struggle within financial constraints
to meet their obligations under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which requires them to
provide interpreters in all civil and criminal proceedings. In Ohio, for example, the
most recent survey of local courts showed that spending on interpreters had increased
to $1.1 million in 2010 from $55,000 in 1998, fueled by profound demographic changes.
Id.
235. Vigil, supra note 232.
236. Santos, supra note 225.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., Court InterpreterLegislation, NAT'L CmR. FOR STr. Crs., http://www.ncsc
.org/Services-and-Experts/Government-Relations/Access-to-Justice/Court-InterpreterLegislation.aspx (last visited Sept. 13, 2015) (providing a summary of the bill introduced
and its impact if approved).
243. State Court Interpreter Grant Program Act, S. 1329, 111th Cong. (2009).
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have authorized $10 million in grants to be awarded by the DOJ in each
fiscal year.2 4 4 "The highest state court of each state would [have been]
eligible to apply for the funds."2 4 5 The bill incorporated language explaining that states applying for the grant would have received a base
amount of $100,000 and the remainder of the funds in the appropriations
would be allocated to the states based on the percentage of individuals (5
years or older) who speak a language other than English at home. 24 6 The
Bill was never approved and, for now, it seems that the economic burden
of court interpreting programs must be shouldered by the states, especially in New Mexico, were noncompliance is not an option. 24 7 "Inadequately funding the judiciary undermines [the] ability to serve the public
and fulfill [the] constitutional responsibility to provide fair, timely and
impartial justice to all." 2 4 8 New Mexico and states alike will have to dig
deep to continue to fund this indispensable tool in their pursuit to increase access to the justice system for LEP speakers.
X.

CONCLUSION

The incorporation of LEP individuals on juries has been a proven success. 24 New Mexico's language assistance program has set a standard, or
at least a foundation, that should be closely followed to encourage LEP
juror participation across the country. Both equal protection under the
law and the Sixth Amendment guarantee that every criminal defendant is
to be tried by an impartial jury. In a sense, effective interpreter assistance programs protect this constitutional guarantee by enabling every
individual to participate in a jury panel representative of society as a
whole.25 0 LEP individuals should be encouraged and provided the same
opportunities to participate in the meaningful aspects of our society.
Often times, however, more focus is placed on efforts to disqualify these
individuals by creating burdensome obstacles for them to overcome. In
the context of fulfilling civic duties as a citizen, accessibility to language
assistance programs ensures every individual, including those with LEP,
are afforded the opportunity to exercise their basic fundamental rights as

244. See Court Interpreter Legislation, supra note 242 (explaining reduction of the
overall funding went down from $15 million due to fiscally austere times).
245. Id.

246. Id.
247. S. 3365 (112th): State Court interpreter Grant Program Act of 2012, GovTIIACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s3365 (last visited Oct. 14, 2015).
248. Vigil, supra note 232.
249. See generally Chavez, supra note 167, at 303 (discussing New Mexico's successful
use of non-English speaking juries).
250. Rose, supra note 12, at 864.
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guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.2 5 1 Preservation of the integrity of
the justice system, unabridged, must be provided in a comprehensive
manner, not merely in one part of the legal proceedings or isolated to one
part of the courthouse. LEP citizens should be integrated in public society, not disqualified from it.

251. See id. at 830 (citing J.E.B. v. Alabama, ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994))
("[J]ury service is the most celebrated responsibility of U.S. citizenship.... Permitting
LEP jurors to serve with the assistance of interpreters instills the value that sharing in the
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.").
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